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Abstract: This article deals with one of the perennial questions of legal and po-
litical philosophy, ie, how the state should relate to religion? It makes a distinction
between five models: (i) the atheist state, (ii) the theocratic state, (iii) the model of
an official state church, (iv) the multiculturalist state, and (v) the agnostic state (or
secular state). The authors reflect on the legitimacy of each of these models. Some
states reclaim their right to adopt an official religion as their state religion or as the
religious Leitkultur of their country (model iii). Others favor the support of religion
as long as this is premised on the equal rights of all religions (model iv). And others
think that the state can only support equal citizenship if the state does not support
any religion whatsoever (model v).
Keywords: agnosticism, church and state, freedom of religion, multiculturalism,
secularism, theocracy
In April 2013, British Prime Minister David Cameron called Great Britain a
‘Christian country.’ Great Britain ought to become ‘evangelical’ again. Not
everyone agreed and a group of 25 public figures accused the prime minister of
sowing discord in the country.1 The prime minister should not voice a preference
for any religion, his critics argued.
But there was also support for Cameron’s position. Bishop Michael Nazir-Ali (b
1949) said: ‘While some acknowledge the debt which Britain owes to the Judeo-
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Christian tradition, they claim also that the values derived from it are now free-
standing and that they can also be derived from other world-views.’2 Nazir-Ali fears
that because this is not possible. There is a danger, he writes, ‘that we are living on
past capital which is showing increasing signs of being exhausted.’3 This is why, like
Cameron, Nazir-Ali believes that we should return to our culture’s Christian roots.
The relationship between state and religion has become controversial again. An
extra dimension to these discussions is the rise of religious radicalism since the 1980s
and 1990s. In Judaism,4 Christianity,5 and Islam,6 it is the orthodox and fundamen-
talist currents that are on the rise. Not moderate religiosity (a ‘loose’ interpretation of
theholy bookanda critical attitudewith regard to religious authority), but the strictest
andmost intolerant forms of religious thinking seem to have thewind in their sails, in
particular the extremely violent Islamic State. How should the state respond to this?
In this article we want to discuss five models for the relationship between the
state and religion. That is because there are five positions the state can take with
regard to religion. In other words, every country can choose from these five options
to organize its relationship with religion.
They are (i) the atheist state; (ii) the theocratic state; (iii) the state with an
official state Church; (iv) the multiculturalist state, and (v) the agnostic state.
1 What is an ‘Atheist’ State?
First, the atheist state. Atheism, in its most elemental form, is a-theism, i. e., the
denial of the claims of theism.7 Theism is the belief in the existence of a specific
God: a personal, transcendent, perfectly benevolent, omnipotent creator of
heaven, and Earth. This God is called God.8
2 Michael Nazir-Ali, Triple Jeopardy for the West: Aggressive Secularism, Radical Islamism and
Multiculturalism (Bloomsbury 2012) 12.
3 ibid 12.
4 Yuval Elizur and LawrenceMalkin, TheWarWithin: Israel’s Ultra-Orthodox Threat to Democracy
and the Nation (Overlook Duckworth 2013).
5 Damon Linker, The Theocons: Secular America under Siege (Doubleday 2006).
6 Bruce Bawer, While Europe Slept: How Radical Islam Is Destroying the West From Within (Dou-
bleday 2006).
7 PB Cliteur, ‘The Varieties of Atheist Experience’ (2010) April/May Philosophy Now 6–8; Paul
Cliteur, ‘The Definition of Atheism’ (2009) Vol 11 Journal of Religion and Society 1–23.
8 Bill Cooke, ‘Atheism’ in Bill Cooke (ed), Dictionary of Atheism, Skepticism, & Humanism (Pro-
metheus Books 2006) 49–50; Paul Edwards, ‘Atheism’ in Paul Edwards (ed), The Encyclopedia of
Philosophy (Vol I, Macmillan & The Free Press 1967) 174–189; Ernest Nagel, ‘ADefense of Atheism’
in Paul Edwards and Arthur Pap (eds), A Modern Introduction to Philosophy (Revised Edition, The
Free Press, Collier-Macmillan, 1967 [1957]) 460–473.
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Atheism has a long history, but because in the past atheists were almost
always persecuted and punished, it is difficult to ascertain how many atheists
actually existed.9 Usually, atheism is a label that philosophers hesitate to adopt to
describe their own position in religious matters (Spinoza and Hume are examples
of thinkers who were labeled atheist and vehemently tried to refute this accusa-
tion.) Because the label atheist was considered a stigma and could have serious
consequences in some countries, many tried to avoid it, which means that we do
not know how many atheists actually exist in the world. So, for the same reason
thatwedonot knowhowmany liberals there are inNorth Korea or howmany critics
of Islam there are in Saudi Arabia (most people prefer to keep their heads attached),
we also do not know how many atheists there were in 16th and 17th century
France.10
Not until the 19th century, when religious persecution became less severe, did
atheists become more outspoken. Only then did a large-scale atheist ‘coming out’
occur.
In our time, atheism went through a revival after 9/11 in the form of what is
called the new atheism, represented by thinkers such as Christopher Hitchens,
Richard Dawkins,11 Sam Harris,12 Daniel Dennett,13 AC Grayling,14 Peter Singer,15
9 AB Drachmann, Atheism in Pagan Antiquity (Glydendal 1922, reprinted by Kessinger Publishing
2005); JB Bury, A History of the Freedom of Thought (Thornton Butterworth 1932 [1913]); Finngeir
Hiorth, Introduction to Atheism (Indian Secular Society 1995).
10 PaulMarshall (ed),Religious Freedom in theWorld:AGlobal Report on FreedomandPersecution
(Freedom House 2000) 268: ’There are small numbers of Saudis of other religions, especially
Christian, but they usually remain hidden since, if discovered, they could be executed as apos-
tates.’On theways inwhich 18th century philosophers tried to escape censorship and persecution,
see Philipp Blom, Wicked Company: Freethinkers and Friendship in Pre-revolutionary Paris
(Phoenix, Weidenfeld & Nicolson 2012).
11 Richard Dawkins, The God Delusion (Paperback edition, Black Swan, Transworld Publishers
2006).
12 Sam Harris, Letter to a Christian Nation (Alfred A Knopf 2006); Sam Harris, The End of Faith:
Religion, Terror, and the Future of Reason (The Free Press 2005).
13 Daniel C Dennett, Breaking the Spell: Religion as a Natural Phenomenon (Allen Lane, Penguin
Books 2006).
14 AC Grayling, The God Argument: The Case against Religion and for Humanism (Bloomsbury
2013); AC Grayling, Against all Gods: Six Polemics on Religion and an Essay on Kindness (Oberon
Books 2007); AC Grayling, To Set Prometheus Free: Essays on Religion, Reason and Humanity
(Oberon Masters 2009).
15 Singer has not written a monography about religion, but his meta-ethical position is well-
known (see, for instance: Marc Hauser and Peter Singer, ‘Morality without Religion’ December
2005/January 2006 Free Inquiry, 18–19) as are his thoughts on the practical consequences of a
secular ethics for bio-ethics. See Peter Singer,Practical Ethics (3rd edn, CambridgeUniversity Press
2011).
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and others.16 But it is important to stress one thing, and that is the new atheism like
the classical atheism of previous generations is a private atheism. This means that
it is a personal conviction of individuals that does not have any ambition to exert
political power. On the contrary, Karl Marx’s atheism became the basis of a state
doctrine. In the Soviet Union, from 1917 onwards, the spreading of atheism became
a goal of the state, the ‘atheist state.’ Marx’s remark that religion ought to be
abolished was interpreted as a directive for the state. It was considered a job of the
state to try to destroy religion as a dangerous societal perversion. The former Soviet
Union and Albania were the most famous examples of this.17
The claim that atheism as a private doctrine inevitably leads to state atheism is
clearly false.18 It can be compared to smoking. People can decide that smoking is
unhealthy and therefore not smoke, or quit smoking. People can also advise others
not to smoke. But it would be unjust to accuse the doctor who gives a person health
advice of the ambition to ‘force’ that person to adopt a healthy lifestyle.
We can compare Hitchens and Dawkins with the doctor from this example.
Lenin and Stalin, on the other hand, favored ‘involuntary commitment’ to a theism
rehab clinic. This is an essential difference.
2 What is a Theocratic State?
Having discussed the firstmodel of the relationship between state and religion, the
atheist state, we now move to the prima facie opposite model (although also
comparable: les extrêmes se touchent): the religious fundamentalist or theocratic
state, as we see it in, for instance, Saudi Arabia and Iran.19 These countries are
theocracies, in which theocracy literally means government by God.20 But just as a
democracy is often governed by representatives of the people, a theocracy is also a
government of representatives, in this case of God.
In the case of a theocracy, the representatives are not ordinary politicians but
clerics with a powerful political ambition. In a theocracy, religion is unavoidably
political.
16 Victor J Stenger, The New Atheism: Taking a Stand for Science and Reason (Prometheus Books
2009); Amarnath Amarasingam (ed), Religion and the New Atheism: A Critical Appraisal (Brill 2010).
17 Sonja Luehrmann, Secularism Soviet Style: Teaching Atheism and Religion in a Volga Republic
(Indiana University Press 2011).
18 But often resurfaces. See, for instance Alister McGrath, The Twilight of Atheism. The Rise and
Fall of Disbelief in the Modern World (Doubleday 2004).
19 Hans-Peter Raddatz, Iran: Persische Hochkultur und irrationale Macht (Herbig Verlagsbuch-
handlung 2006).
20 Amir Taheri, The Persian Night: Iran under the Khomeinist Revolution (Encounter Books 2009).
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It is possible to distinguish two types of religion:
a. Religion as a framework of meaning for individual life.
b. Religion as a shared point of departure for the political community as a whole.
It sounds a bit strange, and that is why this terminology is not common, but it
would be clarifying to distinguish between:
a. Religious religion.
b. Political religion.
The first certainly does not need to lead to the second (contrary towhat is often
argued).21 When Spinoza (1632–1677) identifies nature with God (‘deus sive
natura’) in his Ethics (1678, published posthumously), it could be viewed as a
religious position. But in his Theologico-Political Treatise (1670), that same Spinoza
also develops a scathing criticism of any political religion.22
In the upcoming paragraphs, we will provide an extensive analysis of the
theocratic state. Thismodel of the relationship between state and religion deserves
more time than the first model, because the theocratic state is a kind of ideal for
modern-day theoterrorists. Jihadist murderers like Mohammed Bouyeri (of Theo
van Gogh, † 2004) and Michael Adebolajo (of Lee Rigby, † 2013), but also their
ideologues, such as Osama Bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri, and Ayatollah Kho-
meini, all seem to be inspired by the idea of a theocratic state, a state ruled by God
himself, which is contrasted with a state ruled by mere mortals. That is why it is
highly relevant to study this model, just as it was relevant to study themodel of the
Soviet Union before the fall of the Berlin Wall.23 Those who say that the radicals’
interpretation of Islam is not Islam in its truest form may be right, but they also
totally miss the relevant point.24 From a social-science perfective, it does
not matter what Islam is but what it is perceived to be. To quote Bishop Berkeley
21 See on this Sohail Wahedi, The Constitutional Dynamics of Religious Manifestations: On
abstraction from the religious dimension (Erasmus University Rotterdam 2019).
22 Benedict de Spinoza, Theological-Political Treatise (L 1670, Jonathan Israel ed, Cambridge
University Press 2007).
23 Aswas done by HBActon, The Illusion of the Epoch:Marxism-Leninism as a Philosophical Creed
(Routledge & Kegan Paul 1962); Joseph M Bochenski, Marxismus-Lenisnismus: Wissenschaft oder
Glaube (3rd edn, Günter Olzog Verlag 1975); GA Wetter, Sovietideologie Heute, I, Dialektischer und
historischer Materialismus (Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag 1962).
24 That is also why the work of, for instance, Karen Armstrong cannot be viewed as a relevant
critique of the ideas developed in this chapter. See Karen Armstrong, A History of God: From
Abraham to the Present: the 4000-Year Quest for God (Heinemann 1993); Karen Armstrong, Islam:
A Short History (Random House 2002); Karen Armstrong, The Case for God: What Religion Really
Means (The Bodley Head 2009).
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(1685–1753), ‘To be is to be perceived’ (although it is used very differently here than
the famous Irish philosopher intended it).
As is extensively discussed in The Freedom of Thought Report 2019: A global
report on the rights, legal status and discrimination against humanists, atheists and
the non-religious (2019),25 and all its predecessors, there is no freedomof religion or
belief or freedomof speech in Saudi Arabia.26 There is also no separation of Church
and state, or anything that might be called political secularism. The royal family, in
cooperation with the religious establishment, forces all citizens to abide by the
officialWahhabi interpretation of Islam.27 Blasphemyand apostasy are punishable
by death, although this ultimate punishment is not often carried out. Lesser-
known crimes are ‘witchcraft’ and ‘sorcery.’28 These are punishable by beheading
or crucifixion.29 Notmuch is known aboutmost of these cases because, as Amnesty
International has said, wrongdoers are convicted by special courts to which the
general public does not have access.30
3 Political Islam and Terrorism
Since the terrorist attacks of 9/11, Saudi Arabia has been closely monitored by the
United States and other countries. Domestic terrorist violence (such as the 2003
bombings in the capital, Riyadh) forced the Kingdom to reconsider its approach to
religion and civil liberties. In 2004, therewas a terrorist attack in Khobar that killed
22 people.31 After that, the regime was forced to take the terrorist threat seriously.
The fact that religion is not just an instrument used by the government but also
against the Saudi ruling family becomes clear in 2001. In 2001, Sheik Hamoud bin
25 Humanists International, The Freedom of Thought Report 2019: A global report on the rights,
legal status and discrimination against humanists, atheists and the non-religious (2019) 98.
26 International Humanist and Ethical Union, Freedom of Thought 2014. A Global Report on the
Rights, Legal Status, andDiscrimination Against Humanists, Atheists, and the Non-religious (London
2014); International Humanist and Ethical Union, The Freedom of Thought Report 2017: A Global
report on the rights, legal status and discrimination against humanists, atheists and the non-religious
(IHEU, London 2018).
27 See on this Charles Allen, God’s Terrorists: The Wahhabi Cult and the Hidden Roots of Modern
Jihad (Little, Brown 2006); Natana J DeLong-Bas, Wahhabi-Islam: From Revival and Reform to
Global Jihad (IB Tauris 2007).
28 In 2000, the authorities closed an Ismaili Mosque in the south-western region of Najran
because it was said that ‘witchcraft’was practiced there. Marshall, Religious Freedom in the World
(Rowman & Littlefield Publishers 2008) 348.
29 IHEU (n 26) 176.
30 IHEU (n 26) 176.
31 Marshall (n 28) 346.
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Oqla al-Shuaibi († 2001) proclaimed a fatwa against the Al-Saud royal family.32 The
sheik, who was also a supporter of Al Qaeda and who had praised the attacks of 9/
11, died later that year, but not before he had said that ‘whoever backs the infidel
against Muslims is considered an infidel.’33
The sheik had not always been a lonely figure, at odds with the state’s official
leaders. He had been a respected cleric and scholar who once taught the Saudi
chief justice. But when the Saudi royal family sided with theWestern powers, they
themselves became apostates in the eyes of the exceptionally pious. All Muslims
have a duty to wage jihad against those who attack Muslim states.34
What this shows is that theocracies are always in a precarious position. In a
democracy, any political leader can be replaced by a new leader who gets more
votes from the people. In a theocracy, those who claim to rule according to God’s
dictates can be upstaged by someone who says he knows better what God com-
mands. Every Moses has cause to fear his Phineas.35
Both models, the atheist state and the theocratic state (or the philosophies
behind these models: political atheism and religious fundamentalism), do not
seem very attractive. At least, they are not in harmony with what one could call
individual human rights, such as the right to freely choose one’s religion or the right
to reject a religion that no longer appeals. Contrary to all expectations, theocracy is
back in force nowadays. The atheist state has more or less disappeared from the
world, while the theocratic state, against all expectations, is enjoying a consid-
erable revival.36 ‘Religion and faith in God have made a big comeback. In the past
decades, principles of theocratic governance have accrued significant support
from the public all over the world,’ Ran Hirschl writes.37 This seems to be true. But
the quotation does not say what this means, exactly. It also means that, at the time
we write this, thousands of young people from Europe are waging a ‘Jihad’ to
establish a caliphate in Syria and Iraq. They do not fight for democracy, but for
theocracy.
32 Laurent Murawiec, Princes of Darkness: The Saudi Assault on the West (George Holoch tr,
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers 2005) 89.
33 ‘The fatwa against the royal family’ The Economist (11 October 2001).
34 ibid.
35 Phineas is a religious fanatic (‘zealot’) who, on his own initiative, kills two people accused of
heresy. Godpraised Phineas for it. See the story as told in the Bible: Numbers 25. On themeaning of
Phineas, see John T Collins, ‘The Zeal of Pinechas: The Bible and the Legitimation of Violence’
(Spring 2003) Vol 122 No 1 Journal of Biblical Literature 3–21; Louis H Feldman, ‘The Portrayal of
Pinechas by Philo, Pseudo-Philo, and Josephus’ (Jan–April 2002) Vol 92 No 3/4 The Jewish
Quarterly Review, New Series 315–345.
36 See on this Rainer Hermann, Endstation Islamischer Staat? Staatsversagen und Religionskrieg in
der arabischen Welt (Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag 2015).
37 Ran Hirschl, Constitutional Theocracy (Harvard University Press 2010) 1.
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Exactly what constitutes a theocratic state is, of course, open to debate. From a
certain perspective, there are no ‘true’ theocratic states, because God does not
involve himself inworldly affairs.38 However, we can further specify our definition:
a theocratic state is a state in which a large part of the population thinks that God
runs the state, or where the ruling classes claim that they run the state on the basis
of divine commands. And such countries surely exist in theworld. Many states still
uphold apostasy laws by which people who wish to change religions have to be
punished. Mauritania, Nigeria, Sudan, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia,
Yemen, Somalia, Malaysia, Iran, Bahrein, Afghanistan, and Pakistan are exam-
ples.39 Sooner or later, these countries will have to alter their laws if they want to
uphold individual human rights. In all probability though, they have no interest in
that to begin with.
Manypeoplewho live inWestern democracieswill consider that last statement
to be rather brash. They believe that things are ‘much more complex.’ But the
question is: what is so complicated then?
What makes it complicated for many people is that they believe there is no
such thing as universal values. Many people believe that democracy may be right
for ‘us,’ but not for ‘them,’ for people in other parts of the world, with other mores
and attitudes. Many people believe that although freedom of religion is important
to ‘us,’ it is not to ‘them,’ the people in other countries and cultures. This attitude
runs counter to the perspective the Universal Declaration of Human Rights hoped
to establish in 1948. Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
passed by the United Nations in 1948, says the following:
Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes
freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with
others and in public or private, tomanifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship
and observance.
So the freedom to change religions is not some sort of vague moral demand, but a
basic human right. However, what worries many commentators when, for
instance, Saudi Arabia or Iran is criticized in theWesternworld, is that they believe
that the West does not have the right to judge. They believe this to be ‘arrogant,’
‘judgmental,’ and ‘intolerant.’
38 See Bertrand Russell, A History of Western Philosophy (A Touchstone Book, Simon & Schuster
1972) 247: ‘As for the gods, Epicurus firmly believes in their existence, since he cannot otherwise
account for the wide-spread existence of the idea of gods. But he is persuaded that they do not
trouble themselves with the affairs of our human world.’
39 Angelina Theodorou, ‘Which countries still outlaw apostasy and blasphemy’ (Pew Research
Center, 28 May 2014). See also Paul Cliteur and Tom Herrenberg (eds), The Fall and Rise of Blas-
phemy Law (with a foreword by Flemming Rose, Leiden University Press 2016).
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4 What are State Religions?
The distinction that is usually made between a theocracy (model 2) and a country
that has a state religion (model 3) is that a system with a state religion allows other
religions to exist alongside it. Proponents of state religions usually claim that their
system is a good idea, because members of minority religions are not persecuted.
And it is true that in a state-religion system, dissenters are not necessarily perse-
cuted. For instance, in 21st century England, no one is persecuted for not adhering
to the Anglican Church (as was the case under Henry VIII). But does that make a
state religion an appealing idea?Not quite, because the position ofminorities, both
religious and non-religious, in a country that has a state religion is not ideal.
Because they are discriminated against. After all, the state chooses a single reli-
gious position and grants it privileges. In other words, although model 3 of the
relationship between Church and state is better thanmodels 1 and 2, it still does not
fully satisfy.40
Especially in countries with a high level of secularization and religious
pluralism, state religions create inequality in the form of religious privileges for a
specific part of the population, and this undermines the legitimacy of the state.
It was for this reason that James Madison (1751–1836)41 wrote the First
Amendment to the American Constitution:
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof.
As Brian Grim concludes in a country comparison on the freedom of religion, the
First Amendment protects minority religions (and the state) against the tyranny of
a dominant religion, and the Second Amendment protects religion against the
tyranny of the state.42
The waning of state religions has been a gradual process in theWestern world.
In countless matters, the privileges of a single religion (often Christianity) granted
by the state have been challenged. A famous American activist in this area was
Madalyn Murray O’Hair (1919–1995). She studied law at the South Texas College of
40 See also Paul Cliteur, ‘The Crucifix and the Ideal of a Religiously Neutral State’ (19 April 2018)
Journal of Church and State.
41 See on Madison’s views James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious As-
sessments in James Madison, Writings (first published 1785, The Library of America 1999) 29–39.
42 Brian J Grim, and Roger Finke, The Price of Freedom Denied: Religious Persecution and Conflict
in the Twenty-First Century (Cambridge University Press 2011) 6. Incidentally, what Grim overlooks
in his analysis is that the free exercise of religion is no longer limited primarily by states but by
private groups and individuals: by ‘theoterrorism.’
Atheism, Theocracy, State Church, Multiculturalism, and Secularism 111
Law andgainedgreat notoriety in the 1960swith the trial ofMurray versus Curlett, in
which she took on the mandatory daily prayer in public schools. The immediate
cause of this was the fact that her son William was required to participate in Bible
readings in a public school in Baltimore. O’Hair thought this violated the Consti-
tution,which prescribed a separation of Church and state, after all. In the end, on 17
June 1963, the Supreme Court ruled in her favor, and the daily prayer in public
schoolswas ended. It turnedher into one of themost controversial people of herday
in the United States.43 In 1964, the magazine Life proclaimed her to be ‘the most
hatedwoman inAmerica,’ and she even receivedmany death threats. Nevertheless,
O’Hair tirelessly continued her activism. In O’Hair versus Hill (1984) she won
another lawsuit. This verdict abolished the discriminatory practice of making civil
servants profess a belief inGod in order to be considered for a job in the civil service.
Another subject that has created a big stir is that of religiously neutral edu-
cation. The American lawyer and human rights activist Clarence Darrow (1857–
1938) made a big contribution on this point.
Darrow was born in a family that was once religious but had gradually lost its
faith. Although Darrow’s parents no longer believed, however, they still did not
want to expose their children to the social stigma of non-belief. So they feigned
adherence to the faith, and the children were sent to Sunday school.
Darrow later became one of the most iconic jurist in the United States. He
specialized in labor law, but he also defended many freethinkers and anarchists.
The most important case of his career is of significance to the subject of this
chapter: the Scopes Monkey trial of 1925. It started with the introduction of a law in
Tennessee in 1920 that banned the teaching of Darwinian evolution in schools. The
driving force behind it was the fundamentalist William Jennings Bryan (1860–
1925), a politician and jurist who had tried (and failed) to become president of the
United States three times. On the basis of this law, John T Scopes (1900–1970), a
twenty-one-year-old teacher in Dayton, Tennessee, was prosecuted. He stood
accused of corrupting theminds of the young in biology classes, inwhich he taught
evolution. When Darrow learned that Bryan had offered to act as special prose-
cutor, he decided to offer his services to Scopes. It was a brave decision; public
opinion strongly disfavored Scopes. Initially, Scopes was convicted, although the
trial had offered Darrow a chance to submit Bryan to pointed questioning. On
appeal though, the verdict was overturned, now favoring Scopes (and thus the
teaching of evolution). Largely because of the ‘Monkey Trial,’Darrow became a big
celebrity in the United States.44 At the end of his life, Darrow was so famous that
43 For an overview of her work, see: Bill Cooke, ‘O’Hair, Madalyn Murray’ in Tom Flynn (ed), The
New Encyclopedia of Unbelief (Foreword Richard Dawkins, Prometheus Books 2007) 581–583.
44 See on him Clarence Darrow, The Story of My Life (Charles Scribner’s Sons 1932).
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Tennessee Williams dedicated a play to him: Not about Nightingales (1938). It
features this sentence: ‘This play is dedicated to the memory of Clarence Darrow,
the Great Defender, whose mental frontiers were the four corners of the sky.’
Darrow also worked in the field of criminology, writing Crime, Its Cause and
Treatment (1925), and he was an activist for the abolition of the death penalty.
In themodernworld, a systemwith a state religion is increasingly viewed as an
anomaly, for the reasons mentioned.
In May of 2014, Norway decided to separate the protestant, Lutheran Church
from the state.45 There was a great deal of support for this. In Parliament, there
were 161 votes in favor and only 3 against.
This looked promising. Unfortunately though, the Norwegian Parliament
made a number of reservations that can be viewed as conflictingwith themeasures
being taken. One of these reservations was: ‘The Norwegian Church will continue
to have a special basis in the Constitution and the state will be built upon ‘our
Christian and humanistic heritage’.’46 This is odd and inconsistent. If the Norwe-
gian Church is no longer a state Church, then there is no reason tomention it in the
Constitution. At least, not as long as Wicca, Scientology, Hinduism, and Islam are
excluded from the Constitution (which is undoubtedly the case). And references to
‘our Christian and humanistic heritage’ are fine, but they belong in the history
books, or in treatises on cultural sociology, not in a constitution. The constitution
is a legal document that encodes the legal building blocks of the state, not a
textbook about a country’s cultural history.47
Those who believe that these things are ‘inseparable’ miss the point: they
should be separated.
Other developments in Norway are equally worrying. The newspaper’s report
that now, that the Evangelical Lutheran Church is no longer the state religion, it
will receive public funding ‘on par with other religious and faith-based commu-
nities.’ Apparently, the Norwegian Church is still financed by the state, only now
that is ‘on par’ with ‘other religions.’ So Norway is still not treating all citizens
equally. It may have given up its privileged treatment of Christianity, but it has
replaced it with other privileges. Now, all religions can receive preferential treat-
ment over non-belief.
45 ‘Norway goes secular, removes Lutheran Church as state religion’ The National Post (24 May
2014).
46 ibid.
47 See on the nature and function of constitutions KC Wheare, Modern Constitutions (Oxford
University Press 1951) and James Bryce, ‘Flexible and rigid constitutions’ in Studies in history and
jurisprudence (Volume I, Scientia Verlag Aelen 1980 [Oxford 1901]) 145–252.
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According to the fifth model (the secular or agnostic state), which we will
discuss after this, this is still wrong. But first we will further analyze the fourth
model of the relationship between religion and state, because that is really what
Norway has now become.
5 What is a Multiculturalist State?
The fourth state tries to avoid the problemof unequal treatment by trying to support
all religions equally. The state does not have an obligation to a single religion, but to
all of them: the obligation to treat them all the same. This, apparently, is also the
ambition of theNorwegian state, aswe saw in thepreviousparagraph. Thismodel is
often inspired by a type of discourse that can be qualified as multiculturalist.48
Multiculturalismwas developed by theorists like Bhikhu Parekh (b 1935)49 and
Charles Taylor (b 1931),50 who wanted to give religious and ethnic communities
special rights in relation to the state, for instance to resolve their own legal dis-
putes.
Multiculturalists advocate, for instance, for special Jewish and Islamic
courts to settle the disputes of members of those religious communities.51 And
the state, or the national community, is expected not to interfere in intercom-
munal affairs.
As said, the multiculturalist state52 does not just discriminate against other
worldviews, but also against non-believers (agnostics, atheists, and humanists—
48 Charles Taylor, ‘The Politics of Recognition’ in Charles Taylor,Multiculturalism: Examining the
Politics of Recognition (Edited and introduced by Amy Gutman, Princeton University Press 1994)
25–75. See also Jocelyn Maclure and Charles Taylor, Secularism and Freedom of Conscience
(HarvardUniversity Press 2011); JocelynMaclure andCharles Taylor, Laïcité et liberté de conscience
(La Découverte 2010) in which Taylor uses the language of secularism to defend amulticulturalist
message.
49 Bhikhu Parekh, A New Politics of Identity: Political Principles for an Interdependent World
(Palgrave Macmillan 2008); Bhikhu Parekh, Rethinking Multiculturalism: Cultural Diversity and
Political Theory (Macmillan Press 2000). See also Machteld Zee, Choosing Sharia: multiculturalism,
Islamic fundamentalism and British Sharia Councils (PhD dissertation Leiden 2015).
50 Taylor (n 48).
51 See Machteld Zee, ‘Five Options for the Relationship between the State and Sharia Councils’
(2014) Vol 16 Journal of Religion and Society 1–18; Zee (n 49).
52 As is clear from this passage, wemake a distinction between a ‘multicultural society,’ in which
people with different cultural and religious backgrounds live together, and ‘multiculturalism’ as
an ideology, a political philosophy, for the state. A multiculturalist state is a state that furthers
multiculturalist policy, such as the establishment and defense of group rights (instead of indi-
vidual rights).
114 P Cliteur and A Ellian
those who do not belong to a religious denomination).53 Moreover, in aworld filled
with a plethora of religious beliefs, it is nearly impossible to distinguish religious
beliefs from non-religious beliefs. What, for instance, is the nature of Scientology?
Or Wicca? Should these, generally regarded as more eccentric, religious belief
systems be financed by the state in the sameway that the official religions are? And
what to do about religions that encourage practices thatwe viewas conflictingwith
human rights or the foundations of a liberal-democratic order.
With the publication of Susan Moller Okin’s (1946–2004) essay Is Multicul-
turalism Bad for Women? (1999),54 another aspect of multiculturalism came to the
fore: the frequent glossing over of bad cultural practices. Although multi-
culturalists do not approve of them, they also do not explicitly disapprove. Here,
the mechanism we saw in Van Reybrouck is at work: passivity in criticizing bad
practices because the critic, or better yet, the tradition in which he is placed
(‘Western’), is presumed to carry guilt of its own.
This multiculturalist nonjudgmentalism prevented all sorts of unsavory
practices taking place among ethnic and religious minorities from being
addressed. The most famous of these is female genital mutilation.
Again: of course it would be going much too far to claim that multiculturalists
advocate such practices. Of course they do not. But the problem is: they also do not
feel it is their place to judge (and reject) these things. Multiculturalism is a phi-
losophy that turns appeasing what is wrong into a virtue.
Here, we have to stress that a clear distinction must be made between a
multicultural society and a multiculturalist state.
In everyday language, the word multiculturalism is sometimes also used to
simply describe pluralism.55 ‘You have always cherished multiculturalism,’ Giles
Vanderpooten says to Stéphane Hessel (1917–2013).56 To which Hessel replies that
you ‘have to be open’ to different cultures.57 Everyone ‘has a right’ to his own
53 Brian Barry, Culture & Equality: An Egalitarian Critique of Multiculturalism (Polity 2001); AC
Grayling, ‘Multiculturalism’ in AC Grayling, Ideas thatMatter: A Personal Guide for the 21st Century
(Weidenfeld & Nicholson 2009) 246–249.
54 Susan Moller Okin, ‘Feminism and Multiculturalism: Some Tensions’ (Juli 1998) 108 Ethics
661–684; Susan Moller Okin, Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women? (With respondents, red Joshua
Cohen, Matthew Howard and Martha Nussbaum, Princeton University Press 1999).
55 ’Le multiculturalisme est quelque chose qui vous tient à cœur. De fait, il est indéniable qu’il
faut s’ouvrir aux autres cultures,’ Gilles Vanderpooten says to Stéphane Hessel. See Stéphane
Hessel,Engagez vous!, Entretiens avec Gilles Vanderpooten (Éditions de l’aube 2013) 49. Also see on
this Stanley Fish, ‘Boutique Multiculturalism, or Why Liberals Are Incapable of Thinking about
Hate Speech’ (Winter 1997) Vol 23, No 2 Critical Inquiry 378–395.
56 Hessel (n 55) 49.
57 ibid.
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culture, Hessel says. This is a truth we have to respect. Only on this basis can we
have coexistence instead of conflict, he says.
That sounds good. On the other hand, Hessel wants to stimulate a younger
generation to get involved inmoral projects. He says he wants to do this ‘to change
the world.’ He encourages us to be angry, irritated, and furious.
But the problem is: ‘respect for culture’ is not a good point of departure for
changing the world. It is a good principle for diplomats, but not for Luther, Vol-
taire, Martin Luther King, or other great reformers. In other words: with all due
respect for Hessel, you should, in truth, not always be open to different cultures.
You should really only be open to themwhen they constitute an improvement over
your own cultural pattern. ‘Being open’ to cultural patterns you should be criti-
cizing is harmful; it undermines cultural heritage that deserves to be defended. It
does not stimulate vigilance against evil tendencies in this world.
Perhaps an example can clarify things here. It is an example from the Danish
cartoon crisis. The creation of satire of religious figures is a tradition that deserves
to survive, we believe. Making jokes about quasi-religious matters keeps religious
fanaticism in check.58 As such, allowing this tradition of satire and mockery to
disappear would have harmful effects.
Nevertheless, we see that satire about religion is defended less and less in the
world of today. ‘Righteous indignation,’ especially its most violent forms, is
gaining ground.
On 15 November 2006, at the height of the Danish cartoon crisis, British
journalist and intellectual Christopher Hitchens (1949–2011) gave a lecture in Hart
House, at the University of Toronto, Canada. Canada is a country where multi-
culturalism is official government policy, and unfortunately, it has frequently had
serious and often negative consequences.59 One of the biggest problems seems to
be that ‘tolerance’ too oftenmeans tolerance for the intolerant, and ‘respect’means
respect for the disrespectful.60 Hitchens addressed this decadence in his lecture at
the height of the crisis. He criticized his audience for the sympathy that existed, not
for the Danish cartoonists that had decried the radicals, but for the extremists who
58 Mick Hume, Trigger Warning: Is the Fear of being offensive killing Free Speech? (Willam Collins
2015).
59 Astute critics of Canadian multiculturalism are Neil Bissoondath, Selling Illusions: The Cult of
Multiculturalism in Canada (PenguinBooks 1994);Mark Steyn,AmericaAlone: The End of theWorld
as we know it (Regnery Publishing, Inc 2006); Mark Steyn, Lights Out: Islam, Free Speech and the
Twilight of the West (Stockade Books 2009).
60 See on this HE Baber, The Multicultural Mistique: The Liberal Case against Diversity (Prome-
theus Books 2008); RumyHasan,Multiculturalism: Some Inconvenient Truths (Politico’s Publishing
Ltd 2010).
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were trying to suppress free speech. Hitchens said to the room: ‘Shame on you,
ladies and gentlemen. You are letting this happen.’
And that is the truth of it: freedom that is not defended is destined to disap-
pear, at least if people let it happen.
Unfortunately, multiculturalism as a political philosophy is at the root of
respect for disrespectful fanaticism. Still, many of Moller Okin’s61 colleagues at the
university found it hard to give up their multiculturalist perspectives.
Politics took to this with much greater alacrity than academia. In 2010, German
Chancellor Angela Merkel proclaimed the death of multiculturalism.62 The same
messagecouldbeheard fromFrenchPresidentNicolasSarkozy.63Another voice in the
anti-multiculturalism choir was that of British Prime Minister David Cameron, who
said that state multiculturalism had failed.64 This makes it sound like multicultur-
alism is a lost cause, but, as wewill see, although Cameron and Sarkozy agreed about
what they chose to reject, they differed greatly on what they were willing to accept.
Based on these considerations, we can conclude that it seems the better course
to give up all state aid to religion and adopt a religiously neutral posture in
everything involving the state. This is the fifth model of the relationship between
state and religion, which we will examine now.
6 What is an Agnostic or Secular State?
This last state can be called the secular state or the agnostic state. It is the fifth
model of the possible relationships between state and religion. Before we examine
this model more closely, we must make a note on semantics.
An agnostic is someone who does not adopt a position on the question if God
exists. He suspends his judgment about this.65 Whether agnosticism is a viable
position from the perspective of the individual is not relevant in the context of this
61 Another early critic of multiculturalism along these lines is JeremyWaldron, ‘Minority Cultures
and the Cosmopolitan Alternative’ (1992) Vol 25 University ofMichigan Journal of LawReform 751–
793.
62 ‘Merkel erklärt Multikulti für gescheitert’ Spiegelonline (16 October 2010).
63 ‘Nicolas Sarkozy declares multiculturalism had failed’ The Telegraph (11 February 2011).
64 ‘State multiculturalism has failed, says David Cameron’ BBC News (5 February 2011).
65 Paul Cliteur, ‘Atheism, Agnosticism, and Theism’ in Paul Cliteur, The Secular Outlook: in
Defense of Moral and Political Secularism (Wiley-Blackwell 2010) 14–69; John Bernard Dalgairns,
‘Is God unknowable?’ in Contemporary Review (Vol XX, 1872) 615–630, also in Andrew Pyle (ed),
Agnosticism: Contemporary Responses to Spencer and Huxley (Thoemmes Press 1995) 20–38;
Thomas Henry Huxley, ‘Agnosticism and Christianity’, 1889, in Thomas Henry Huxley, Agnosti-
cism and Christianity. And other Essays, (Prometheus Books 1992) 193–232.
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chapter, but we will defend here that it is a legitimate and even beneficial position
for a state. A great advantage of the agnostic state is that it does not make a
distinction between its citizens. The agnostic state treats all citizens equally. The
agnostic or secular state does not combat the religious convictions of its citizens,
but it does not defend any religious position either. The agnostic state allows all
citizens worship the gods of their choice.
As such, agnosticism (or secularism) with regard to religion seems a wise path
to take when it comes to government policy. A state that has adopted political
agnosticism or secularism as its official governing principle is France.
The French minister of immigration and integration described this open
character of the French state in a lecture in 2010, when he said that France is not a
people, or a language, or a territory, or a religion, but a conglomerate of people
who want to live together (‘vivre ensemble’).66 To make this ‘living together’
possible, it is important that the state does not identify itself with what divides
people: their religion. But although the French state has always championed this
policy of secularism, even devising a special word for it (laïcité), it is not an
exclusively French principle. The great historian of Islam and Islamic societies,
Bernard Lewis (b 1916) pointed to a nearly forgotten American declaration of the
same ideal. He quoted the ‘somewhat neglected John Tyler,’ who, in a letter of 10
July 1843, gave eloquent voice to the principle of freedom of religion:
TheUnited States have adventuredupon a great andnoble experiment,which is believed to have
been hazarded in the absence of all previous precedent—that of total separation of Church and
State. No religious establishment by law exists among us. The conscience is left free from all
restraint and each is permitted to worship his Maker after his own judgment. The offices of the
Government are open alike to all. No tithes are levied to support an established Hierarchy, nor is
the fallible judgment of man set up as the sure and infallible creed of faith. TheMahommedan, if
he will to come among us would have the privilege guaranteed to him by the constitution to
worship according to the Koran; and the East Indian might erect a shrine to Brahma if it so
pleased him. Such is the spirit of toleration inculcated by our political Institutions […]. The
Hebrewpersecuted and downtrodden in other regions takes uphis abode amonguswithnone to
makehimafraid […] and theAegis of theGovernment is overhim todefendandprotect him.Such
is the great experiment which we have tried, and such are the happy fruits which have resulted
from it; our systemof free governmentwouldbe imperfectwithout it. Thebodymaybeoppressed
and manacled and yet survive; but if the mind of man be fettered, its energies and faculties
perish, and what remains is of the Earth, earthly. Mind should be free as the light or as the air.67
66 Éric Besson, in a speech of 5 January 2010: ’La France n’est ni un peuple, ni une langue, ni un
territoire, ni une religion, c’est un conglomérat de peuples qui veulent vivre ensemble.’ Cited in
Alain Finkelkraut, L’identité malheureuse (Éditions Stock 2013) 105.
67 Bernard Lewis, ‘The Roots of Muslim Rage’ in The Atlantic Monthly, September 1990, reprinted
in Bernard Lewis, From Babel to Dragomans: Interpreting the Middle East (Weidenfeld & Nicolson
2004) 319–331.
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So much for the American President John Tyler (1790–1862).
7 Is Secularism Typically Western?
There is one view that stands in the way of the further spread of secularism, and
that is that it is claimed to be a typically Western concept. We disagree. Here, we
can refer to Bishop Nazir-Ali, with whomwe began this chapter, but this time for a
view with which we fully agree.
BishopNazir-Ali points to the political philosophy of Pakistan at the time of the
state’s founding. Religious tensions were resolved peacefully. Women were free to
go where they pleased and wear what they wanted.68 Karachi was a cosmopolitan
city that drew a great diversity of visitors, and non-Muslims were a prominent
feature of everyday life. As Nazir-Ali writes, all of this was in accordance with what
the founder of the Pakistani state, Mohammad Ali Jinnah (1876–1948), had
intended: ‘Religion had little to do with the workings of the state.’69 Jinnah was, in
other words, a secularist.
And secularism is not a kind of colonial vestige of Western thought; in non-
Western traditions, too, there are countless countries where a secular vision of the
state has taken root.70
This is especially important in a time and context when states are being
challenged to legitimize their own existence. Modern theoterrorism is, in a way,
forcing states to formulate answers to the criticism they face. Ignoring the criti-
cism and pretending it does not exist does not seem to be a wise course. So let us
end this chapter with the observation that both a religiously neutral political
language and a religiously neutral state are the best answers to modern-day
theoterrorism and religious extremism. The revival of theocracy is best countered
by relinquishing all remnants of religious discrimination in our liberal demo-
cratic states.
68 Nazir-Ali, Triple Jeopardy for the West: Aggressive Secularism, Radical Islamism and Multicul-
turalism (Bloomsbury 2012) 95.
69 ibid. We quote this passage because it is so astonishing that the same author is also highly
negative about modern-day prognoses of secularism. In the subtitle of his book, Nazir-Ali turns
against what he calls ‘aggressive secularism.’ He does not make clear what he means by this
though. See also Alain Finkelkraut, L’identité malheureuse (Éditions Stock 2013) 18.
70 See for the Indian tradition: Finngeir Hiorth, Introduction to Atheism (Indian Secular Society
1995); Finngeir Hiorth, Introduction to Humanism (Indian Secular Society 1996); Amartya Sen,
‘Secularism and Its Discontents’ in Amartya Sen (ed), TheArgumentative Indian:Writings on Indian
History, Culture and Identity (Allen Lane/Penguin Books 2005) 294–316; Amartya Sen, Identity and
Violence: The Illusion of Destiny (WW Norton & Company 2006).
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8 The French Laïcité as Consistent Secularism
But there is a condition. The agnostic or secular state is based on the assumption
that the state itself is religiously neutral. This means that civil servants are ex-
pected not to express their personal religious convictions.71 In France, thismodel is
realized by means of the principle of so-called laïcité.
As a result of the conclusions drawn by a state commission on thematter, the
Stasi commission, the French state created legislation governing the wearing of
religious symbols in French public schools and by people employed by the
government.72 Especially the ban on religious symbols in schools (not just
crucifixes and yarmulkes but also Islamic headscarves) led to a long and
sometimes bitter controversy between opponents and proponents of the
neutrality principle.73 One of the most frequent complaints about the French
system is that it targets Muslim women. It is their religious right to wear head-
scarves. When the system denies them this right, the system is inherently
discriminatory.
The cultural historian Andrew Hussey (b 1963) writes about the riots in the
French banlieus and how France reacted to them in his book The French Intifada
(2014). Most commentators agreed that thiswas a social justice issue, not a cultural
one. Hussey does not believe this is true. He posits that there is a ‘very real conflict
in modern-day France between the opposing principles of laïcité and communi-
tarianism, which is expressed in the riots.’74
Hussey is right, we believe, when he says that these riots reveal an issue of
principle (although one cannot agree with his insinuation that, therefore, the
French system is illegitimate).
The French ban on full face covering in public drew a great deal of criticism. At
the front lines of this debate was the then French president, Nicolas Sarkozy, who
71 See on the French system: Murat Akan, ‘Laïcité and multiculturalism: the Stasi Report in
context’ (2009) 60 (2) The British Journal of Sociology 237–256; Patrick Weil, ‘Why the French
Laïcité is Liberal’ (2009) 30 (6) Cardozo Law Review 2699–2714.
72 Laïcité et République, Rapport au Président de la République, Commission présidée par Ber-
nard Stasi, La Documentation française 2004; Robert O’Brien, The Stasi Report: The Report of the
Committee of Reflection on the Application of the Principle of Secularity in the Republic (William S
Hein & Co, Inc 2005).
73 One of the earliest manifestations was: Elisabeth Badinter, Regis Debray, Alain Finkelkraut,
Elisabeth de Fontenay, Catharine Kintzler, ‘Profs, ne capitulons pas!’ Le Nouvel Observateur (2/8
November 1989). Een latere selectie van standpunten in Jean-Michel Helvig, La laïcité dévoilée.
Quinze années de débat and quarante « Rebonds », Líberation/éditions de l’aube, Paris 2004.
74 AndrewHussey,The French Intifada: the LongWar betweenFrance and its Arabs (Faber&Faber
2014) 8.
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declared in June of 2009 that the burka75 was not welcome in France.76 In his first
presidential address to a joint session of both chambers of the French Parliament
(thefirst in 136 years), he declared his support for a ban. He said: ‘Wecannot accept
that, in our country,women live behind nets, cut off from social life, robbed of their
identities.’77 The president also referred to human dignity, applied towomen: ‘This
is not the idea the French Republic has of the dignity of women.’78 And the most
relevant quotation in the context of this chapter: ‘The burka is not a religious
symbol, but a symbol of submissiveness, and it will not bewelcome on the territory
of the French Republic.’ In France, there is a broad consensus between left and
right about the burka. André Gerin (b 1946), amember of the communist party who
led the latest investigation into this religious-cultural phenomenon called the
burka a ‘mobile prison’ for women.79
But there is also a great deal of criticism of the French system, especially from
Anglo-Saxon countries that are more oriented toward multiculturalism. This crit-
icism comes in two forms.80 First, it is often said that the French authorities
intended to target the Muslim community. And how could it be otherwise? The
Christians do not wear religious symbols to school (or in amuchmore limited way;
a cross around the neck is not very noticeable and, moreover, it is easy to wear it
even less visibly). Second, it is argued that, although the French state does not
intend to discriminate against those who wear headscarves, this is the effect.
Let us briefly comment on both objections. First, the argument of discrimi-
natory intent.
On 15 March 2004, a French law was announced that stipulated that ‘in pri-
mary and secondary schools, the wearing of symbols or clothing that clearly ex-
press a religious faith is prohibited.’ Cécile Laborde, a commentator with a French
background, but clearly no friend to the French system, offers the following
75 The burka is a garment that covers the face, in contrast with the headscarf, which only covers
the hair.





80 Although the French system is rejected almost everywhere in the Anglo-Saxon world, it has
some knowledgeable defenders in the French-speaking world, such as: Jeanette Bougrab, Ma
république se meurt, (Éditions Grasset & Faquelle 2013); Caroline Fourest, Quand la gauche a du
courage: chroniques résolument progressistes et républicaines (Grasset 2012); Henri Pena-Ruiz,
Dictionnaire amoureux de la laïcité (Plon 2014); Alain Finkelkraut, L’identité malheureuse (Éditions
Stock 2013); Régis Debray, Ce que nous voile le voile: La République et le sacré (Gallimard 2004);
Catherine Kintzler, Qu’est-ce que la laïcité? (La librairie philosophique J Vrin 2007).
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commentary on this law: ‘This law is aimed at Islamic headscarves, although
Jewish yarmulkes and Christian crosses are also banned in public schools.’81
The question is whether this is an overly tendentious description of the situ-
ation. What does the quoted sentence mean? Is it possible to say, as this writer
does, that this law is primarily ‘aimed at’ Islamic headscarves, if she has tomention
in the same breath that it applies to all religious symbols? From what does she
conclude that is it aimed at the Islamic headscarf in particular? Would it not be
better to say that this lawwas aimed at thewearing of religious symbols in general,
and thus also against headscarves? That has a very different ring to it, does it not?
Laborde’s phrasing seems to suggest that the French legislator has the explicit
intention of targeting the Muslim community. What are her arguments for this
serious accusation?
Why does Laborde not say: ‘The law is aimed at headscarves, yarmulkes, large
crosses […], et cetera’? If it had been phrased like that, the sentence would have
been unnecessary, of course, but also much less tendentious.
Commentators on the French state often feel that they have observed some-
thing of great importance when say that the French law banning the wearing of
religious symbols was drafted in response to the wearing of headscarves. But in
reality that is nothing more than a historical fact of very limited relevance to the
principle. Perhaps this can be illustrated by an example.
The kirpan is a ceremonial sword or knife worn by Sikhs. In the Sikh com-
munity, the wearing of this dagger is viewed as a religious precept. This precept
goes back to a command by the guru Gobind Singh (1666–1708) who decided in
1699 that all Sikh’s must wear this ‘religious dagger.’
Now imagine that there were not many Muslims living in France, but a great
many Sikhs instead. And say the French government had tightened legislation
banning the wearing of religious symbols in public schools. Would it then be
possible to say that the French state had the intention of targeting the Sikhs in
particular?
We think it would be misleading to make that claim. By phrasing it like that,
the misconception that the French state has it out for Sikhs in particular is intro-
duced, when that state is doing nothing more than enforcing a constitutional
principle, also with regard to Sikhs.
If the state did not do that last, if it granted a special privilege to a particular
religious community, giving it an exemption from the general law, the state would
bemaking a gravemistake. And that is discriminating against religious groups that
are willing to comply with the law.
81 Cécile Laborde, ‘Secular Philosophy and Muslim Headscarves in Schools’ (2005) 13 (3) The
Journal of Political Philosophy 305–329, 325.
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The second form of criticism that is often leveled against the French system is
that, regardless of the French authorities’ motives, the system has the indirect
effect of primarily impacting the Muslim community. So it is not about the French
government’s intention but about the unintended effect of the legislation. For
Christians, wearing headscarves is not a religious duty, so they are not impacted
by a prohibition against it; Muslims are. So should we not say that indirectly
Muslims are affected more by the prohibition against wearing evidently religious
symbols?
A few things can be said in response to these arguments. The first critique (the
‘bad intentions’ theory) assumes a kind of conspiracy. It tries accuse those who
support a rational political philosophy (and whatever one may say about laïcité; it
is a clear and consistent position)82 of darker ‘true motives’ that the people in
question, or the state that is taking the action, are keeping under wraps.83 The
second version of this argument, the argument of indirect discrimination, has more
merit, but does not convince in the end either.84 The problemwith the argument of
indirect discrimination is that it fails to recognize that, when you make a rule that
prohibits a certain behavior, there will always be a group (with certain specific
characteristics) whose behavior is particularly affected by that rule.
Take the rule that forbids sex with children below a certain age. This rule
affects pedophiles. That is hard to deny. But does it make sense to say that the rule
‘discriminates against people for their sexual orientation’ (pedophilia)?
This brings us to the complex question of when a particular rule is ‘discrim-
inatory.’ It does not seem unreasonable to us to defend that a rule is ‘discrimi-
natory’ when a type of behavior that is prohibited for one group is allowed for
another.
So say that Muslims were not allowed to wear headscarves, but Jews were
allowed to wear yarmulkes. In such a situation, complaints about discrimination
would be justified (and necessary). But in the case of the ban on the wearing of
religious symbols (regardless of whether they are Christian, Jewish, or Islamic in
nature), there is no discrimination, even if a particular group is more affected by
the ban.
82 For a recent defense, see Henri Pena-Ruiz, Dictionnaire amoureux de la laïcité (Plon 2014).
Other proponents of the system are: Fourest (n 80); Debray (n 80); Alain Finkelkraut, L’identité
malheureuse (Éditions Stock 2013).
83 This is defended with great vigor in: Joan Wallach Scott, The Politics of the Veil (Princeton
University Press 2007), but also, unfortunately, in: Martha Nussbaum (ed), The New Religious
Intolerance: Overcoming the Politics of Fear in an Anxious Age (Harvard University Press 2012).
84 Wealso encounter this in Laborde: ’Laïcitéwas intended as a principle of equality, yet it can be
argued that the ban on headscarves constitutes a case of indirect discrimination and thus infringes
on equality. See Laborde (n 81) 329.
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This point is not only made in the context of the wearing of religious symbols,
but also, for instance, in the discussion about the death penalty.85 It is a statistical
fact that more black people end up on the electric chair than white people. Does
this mean that the death penalty is ‘discriminatory’? Although there are many
convincing arguments against the death penalty, this is not one of them. What the
death penalty ‘discriminates against’ is murder (or other crimes for which it is
imposed), but it does not discriminate against black people. It would be discrim-
inatory if a white man were to be acquitted for an act or behavior for which a black
man would have been convicted.
It is, however increasingly difficult to uphold secular principles in an age
where religious fanaticism is so influential. We finish this chapter by presenting
some recent case law of the European Court of HumanRights in defending freedom
of speech against attempts to stifle that principle.
9 Abdullah Riza Ergüven (2005)
Freedom of speech and freedom of religion are severely jeopardized by ‘theo-
terrorist assault’ on these principles. Jihadists have vowed to destroy these prin-
ciples, and governments of secular nation-states have great difficulty in countering
their attempts. Can the judiciary be of any help?
When it comes to its case law on the freedom of expression, the European
Court has developed two opposite positions. One position protects the right to
‘offend shock and disturb.’86 The other position protects hurt feelings of religious
believers against the freedom of expression.87
Most of the Court’s case law was developed against a Christian backdrop.
Should, for instance, Catholic symbols get special protection by the law (and from
the Court)? Since 2001, however, discussion about other religions and their adher-
ents’ feelingshas also reached theEuropeanCourt. In 2005, the sameyear theDanish
cartoons set Europe on fire (literally, as Danish embassies were burned because of
thepictures),88 therewas a case before theCourt on freedomof expression in Turkey.
İA v Turkey (2005) was about a publishing house that had released a novel by
85 See, eg, Louis Pojman, ‘In Defense of the Death Penalty’ in Hugh LaFolette (ed), Ethics in
Practice. An Anthology (Blackwell 2002) 493–502; Ernest van den Haag, ‘The Death Penalty Once
More’ (Summer 1985) 18 UC Davis Law Review 957–972.
86 Handyside v UK (1976) Series A No 24; (1979-80) 1 EHRR 737.
87 Otto Preminger Institute v Germany (1994) Series A no 295-A; (1995) 19 EHRR 34.
88 Jytte Klausen, The Cartoons that Shook theWorld (Yale University Press 2009); Flemming Rose,
The Tyranny of Silence: HowOne Cartoon Ignited a Global Debate on the Future of Free Speech (Cato
Institute 2014).
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Abdullah Riza Ergüven titled Yasak Tümceler (‘The forbidden phrases’).89 Although
the book is a novel, it also deals with philosophical and theological issues.90 The
publisher was convicted under Article 175 of the Turkish Criminal Code, which
penalizes blasphemy against ‘God, the Religion, the Prophet and the Holy Book.’91
Anexpert report byProfessor Salih Tuğ, deanof theology atMarmaraUniversity,was
especially critical of Ergüven’s novel. As Tuğ declared, Ergüven ‘imprisons readers
within the limits of his own views, which are devoid of all academic rigors. […] He
criticizes the beliefs, ideas, traditions, andway of life of Anatolian Turkish society by
adopting the independent and nonconformist viewpoint of the leaders, thinkers and
scientists of theRenaissance to enlighten and advise our people as he seesfit.’92 ‘This
way of thinking,’ Professor Tuğ continues, is ‘based on materialism and positivism,
leads to atheism in that it renounces faith and divine revelation.’93
These matters were of grave concern to the expert, but worse was that ‘it may
be observed that they also contain statements that imply a certain element of
humiliation, scorn and discredit vis-à-vis religion, the Prophet and belief in God
according to Islam.’94 Professor Tuğ summarizes the novelist’s views:
In the author’s view, religious beliefs and opinions are mere obscurities, and ideas based on
nature and reasons are described as clear-sighted. The author describes religious faith as a
‘desert mirage’, a ‘primitive idea’ and ‘desert ecstasy’, and religious practices as ‘the primi-
tivism of desert life.’95
One may object that this is nothing special from the perspective of the French
(Voltaire), British (Locke, Hume), and American (Jefferson,96 Paine97) Enlighten-
ment philosophers.98 So, the question is whether these forms of expression should
not be protected under a human rights regime.
This is certainly not the view of the Turkish authorities, and in this case they were
not contradicted by the European Court in Strasbourg. Why not? The Court answered,
89 İ A v Turkey App no 42571/98 (ECtHR, 13 September 2005).
90 ibid para 5.
91 ibid para 6.
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referring to the Handyside case, that although pluralism, tolerance, and broad-
mindedness are the ‘hallmarks of a democratic society,’99 there is a limit. ‘The present
case,’ the Court said, ‘concerns not only comments that offend or shock, or a ‘pro-
vocative’ opinion, but also an abusive attack on the Prophet of Islam.’ It continued,
Notwithstanding the fact that there is a certain tolerance of criticism of religious doctrine
within Turkish society, which is deeply attached to the principle of secularity, believers may
legitimately feel themselves to be the object of unwarranted and offensive attacks through the
followingpassages: ‘Someof thesewordswere,moreover, inspired in a surge of exultation, in
Aisha’s arms. […] God’smessenger brokehis fast through sexual intercourse, after dinner and
before prayer. Muhammad did not forbid sexual intercourse with a dead person or a live
animal.’100
Apparently, the clauses of the Handyside case that one may hold opinions that
‘offend shock or disturb’ as protected by the freedom of expression are not
applicable when it comes to an ‘abusive attack on the Prophet of Islam.’101
The Court ruled that therewas no violation of Article 10 of the Convention (i. e.,
the right to freedom of speech). But this judgment was supported by only a small
majority (four votes to three) of the judges. The three dissenting voices protested
that ‘a democratic society is not a theocratic society’102:
Freedom of the press relates to matters of principle, and any criminal conviction has what is
known as a ‘chilling effect’ liable to discourage publishers from producing books that are not
strictly conformist or ‘politically (or religiously) correct.’ Such a risk of self-censorship is very
dangerous for this freedom, which is essential in a democracy, to say nothing of the implicit
encouragement of blacklisting or ‘fatwas.’103
Only one year later, in 2006, the Court heard another case on free speech involving
Turkey. This time it was not about a novelist but a journalist. This time, the result
was the complete opposite.
10 Erdoğan Aydın Tatlav (2006)
Mr Erdoğan Aydın Tatlav published five volumes titled İslamiyet Gerçeği (‘The
Reality of Islam’).104 The first of these volumes, published in 1992, criticized the
99 İ A v Turkey App no 42571/98 (ECtHR, 13 September 2005) para 28.
100 ibid para 29.
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104 This case is only available in French: Aydin Tatlav v Turkey App no 50692/99 (ECtHR, 2 May
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Koran.105 Philosopher Russell Blackford characterizes Tatlav’s work as a ‘blatantly
atheistic and anti-religious book,’ but the expert did not mean that abuse but as
praise.106 In his work, Tatlav analyzed the development of religious thinking, the
logic of the Koran with regard to proof of God’s existence, the notions of paradise
and hell in the Koran, whether the Koran is subject to change and interpretation,
the way the Prophet Mohammed received his revelations, and the question
whether the religion of Islam is a tribal creed. In 4 years, 16,500 copieswere sold.107
But although there was no reaction from Turkish authorities, in 1997 the Turkish
public prosecutor in Ankara accused the author of having published a book
‘profaning one of the religions.’108 This religion was, of course, Islam. One of the
complaints of Tatlav’s treatment of thematterwas that he had scolded Islam for the
extreme sensitivity of the Islamic believers. Apparently, Islam was a religion that
lacked self-confidence, Tatlav claimed. This lack of self-confidence also man-
ifested itself in the extreme cruelty of the sanctions prescribed by the Koran.109
Tatlav was also quite explicit about the Prophet Mohammed. Mohammed, Tatlav
wrote, took his dreams for reality, he presented verses that were absolutely
crazy,110 and he promised an afterlife for men living the lives of parasitic aristo-
crats. Before the judicial authorities Tatlav made clear that he wanted to have his
books considered scientific treatises on all religions and prophets.111 It cannot
come as a surprise that Tatlav also maintained that God cannot exist.112
Like in IA v Turkey, Tatlav was prosecuted under Article 175 of the Turkish
penal code. But this time the judgment was totally different. The European Court
recapitulated precedents on freedom of speech and considered the grounds
justifyingOtto Preminger’s condemnation. But this time the Court said that it could
not find an insulting tone toward other believers or an attack on sacred symbols
(‘un ton insultant visant directement la personne des croyants, ni une attaque
injurieuse pour des symboles sacrés […]’).113 The Court came to a unanimous
support of freedom of speech.
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It is not easy to find some consistency in the European Court’s judgments on
blasphemy bans.114 This holds true particularly for the last judgment we want to
discuss, a case that arose in Austria. This time the defendantwas not a novelist (IA)
or a research journalist (Tatlav) but a social activist.
11 Elisabeth Sabaditsch-Wolff (2018)
Elisabeth Sabaditsch-Wolff was convicted for (i) ‘denigration of religious beliefs of
a legally recognized religion,’ which is sanctioned in Section 188 of the Austrian
Criminal Code, and (ii) incitement to hatred, penalized in Article 283 of the same
code. The first article penalizes the Herabwürdigung religiöser Lehren, the defa-
mation of religious doctrines.115 Ms Sabaditsch’s conviction was based on what
said during a seminar, ‘Basic Information on Islam’ (‘Grundlagen des Islams’).
On 15 October and 12 November 2009, she hosted a seminar with around 30
participants at each gathering.116 But not only were ordinary participants present.
‘One of the participants was an undercover journalist working for a weekly jour-
nal.’117
When Sabaditsch-Wolff was questioned by the police concerning ‘certain
statements’ she had made during the seminars, it appeared that the journalist had
requested preliminary investigation of her.118 The Austrian court found she was
guilty of ‘publicly disparaging an object of veneration of a domestic Church or
religious society, namelyMuhammad, the Prophet of Islam, in amanner capable of
arousing justified indignation’ (‘geeignet, berechtigtes Ärgernis zu erregen’).119
What had Sabaditsch-Wolff said about Mohammed that led to her conviction?
Shewas convicted based on two criticisms, one general and one specific. Themore
general criticism contested the status of Mohammed as ‘the idealman,’ ‘the perfect
human.’120 She voiced three complaints: first, that Mohammed was a warlord;
114 See also Jeroen Temperman, Religious Hatred and International Law: The Prohibition of
Incitement to Violence or Discrimination (Cambridge University Press 2016) 361 (speaks of the
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second, that Mohammed endorsed polygamy; and third, that ‘he liked to do it with
children.’ For these reasons he was not the most perfect man.
One may object, what does that matter? Why is this important to digress upon
in our time, more than seven centuries beyond Mohammed’s lifetime? Sabaditsch-
Wolff’s answer to that question is that moral commentary on the life of the Prophet
is important because contemporary Muslims see him as a model to emulate. So
when today’sMuslims get into conflicts with democracy and ‘our systemof values,’
Sabaditsch-Wolff said, we can understand these conflicts by examining the
background of the moral icon they try to copy.121
The second point that got Sabaditsch-Wolff into trouble was her more specific
critique of the Prophet. For this she had used one of the most important Hadith
collections available, that of Muhammad al-Bukhari (810–70). This collection of
hadiths has great authority in the Muslim world. If something is included in Al-
Bukhari’s collection, it has the status of Holy Scripture. In this collection there is a
story about Mohammed, being a man of middle age, and his wife Aisha. When
Mohammed married Aisha, she was 6 years old,122 and the marriage was
consummated when she was nine.123
According to Sabaditsch-Wolff, this was a matter of great moral concern and
had far-reaching consequences. During the seminar she had discussed this by
relating a conversation she had conducted with her sister on this delicate issue.
The conversation revolved around how to interpret this historical issue. During
that conversation she had asked her sister, ‘A fifty-six-year-old and a six-year-old?
What do you call that? Give me an example? What do we call it, if it is not pedo-
philia?’124 Her sister said, ‘Those were different times.’ But Sabaditsch-Wolff was
adamant: ‘It wasn’t okay back then, and it is not okay today.’125
Sabaditsch-Wolff also discussed the relevance of this story for our contem-
porary world: ‘It is still happening today.’126 She means, there are still child
marriages organized in the Islamic world. The moral legitimacy of these marriages
is found in a record considered historically uncontestable by at least some Mus-
lims.
The Austrian Regional Court did not comment on whether the story was
considered historically accurate in the Muslim world, nor did it discuss the sig-
nificance of this story for the position of underaged girls in the Islamic word. The
121 ibid.
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Court only commented on one aspect: Could Sabaditsch-Wolff’s conversation with
her sister was interpreted as conveying the message that Mohammed had ‘pae-
dophilic tendencies’? And if so, could this be considered ‘publicly disparaging an
object of veneration of a domestic Church or religious society’?127 The Court
answered affirmatively because Sabaditsch-Wolff ‘had suggested that Muhammed
was not a worthy subject of worship.’128 The word ‘paedophilia’ was capable of
‘arousing indignation,’ the Austrian Court said. A reason the Austrian Court
considered the word ‘paedophilia’ inapplicable was that when Aisha had turned
18, the Prophet had not annulled the marriage.129
Another point discussed before the Austrian Court was whether something
said at a gathering of 30 people is sufficiently ‘public’ to warrant a conviction. The
Austrian Court answered in the affirmative because ‘it was conceivable that at least
some of the participants might have been disturbed by the statements.’130
But what about the point of Mohammed’s exemplary role, the Prophet being
an object of emulation? The Austrian Court ignored the issue and only said that
Sabaditsch-Wolff’s discussion did ‘not contribute to a debate of public interest.’131
Her statements had not been ‘statements of fact’ but only ‘derogatory value
statements.’132 Discussing child marriages would have been possible, according to
the Austrian Court, but this is not the same as pedophilia.133 Besides, child mar-
riage is not only a ‘phenomenon of Islam’ but also among the European dy-
nasties.134 The Austrian Court also scolded the applicant for her conception of (or
rather lack of) tolerance. ‘Presenting objects of religious worship in a provocative
way capable of hurting the feelings of the followers of that religion could be
conceived as a malicious violation of the spirit of tolerance, which was one of the
bases of a democratic society.’135 In doingwhat she had done,Ms Sabaditsch-Wolff
had violated the ‘religious peace in Austria.’136
This concept of ‘religious peace’ is a recurrent theme in the comments of the
Regional Austrian Court, as it was also in the Vienna Court of Appeal, which
confirmed the applicant’s conviction. The Vienna Court added another argument
127 ibid para 12.
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to dismiss the pedophilia accusation of Sabaditsch-Wolff: Mohammed’s first wife
had been 15 years older than he was.
The Austrian courts convicted the accused under two articles in the Austrian
Penal Code. First, Article 188, which criminalizes offenses against religious peace
(Strafbare Handlungen gegen den religiösen Frieden). It reads as follows:
Whoever, in circumstances where his or her behavior is likely to arouse justified indignation,
publicly disparages or insults a personwho, or an object which, is an object of veneration of a
Church or religious community established within the country, or a dogma, a lawful custom
or a lawful institution of such a Church or religious community, shall be liable to up to 6
months’ imprisonment or a day-fine for a period of up to 360 days.137
The second article is Section 283 of the Austrian Penal Code, which penalizes
incitement to hatred:
1. Whoever, in a manner capable of endangering public order, publicly incites to commit a
hostile act against a Church or religious community established within the country or against
a group defined by its belonging to such a Church or religious community, a race, a nation, a
tribe or a state, shall be liable to up to 2 years’ imprisonment.
2. Similarly, whoever publicly incites against a group defined in paragraph 1 or tries to insult
or disparage them in a manner violating human dignity shall equally be held liable.138
The European Court did not reject the verdicts of the Austrian courts. The Court
agreed that Sabaditsch-Wolff ‘must have been aware that her statements were
partly based on untrue facts and apt to arouse (justified) indignation in others.’139
Apparently, the Court focused on the ‘untrue fact’ of pedophilia while remaining
silent on the age difference between Aisha and the middle-aged Prophet. There is
also no further analysis in the judgment of the European Court about the right
definition of pedophilia. Is it right to assume, as both the Austrian courts and the
European Court do, that someone is not a pedophile if he or she also has sexual
relationships with adults? Or is not a pedophile if he or she had a relationship with
an adult later in life?Or that a pedophile label no longer applies once anunderaged
girl reaches the age of maturity?
The essence of Sabaditsch-Wolff’s complaints seems to be the age difference
between the religious icon and the underaged girl and the social consequences of
that fact. This age difference is not an ‘untrue fact,’ or at least it is not contested in
Islamic lore.
A somewhat uncomfortable conclusion that may be drawn from the European
Court’s stance in this matter is that at a time when certain elements of Islamic
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culture are criticized, this criticism is stifled not only by theoterrorist attacks
(Danish cartoons, French cartoons, and American cartoons) but also by judgments
from the very same institutions invented to protect the freedom to criticize in 47
European countries. Just like in İA v Turkey (2005), the European Court came to a
unanimous judgment rejecting the applicant’s recourse to freedom of expression
under the European Convention of Human Rights.
The problem with ES v Austria seems to be that the principles of the secular
state are seriously jeopardized by the threat of religious terrorism. And in this
judgment the European Court is not on the side of those who want to rescue
secularism from the assault of those who pose the most serious challenge.
The authors argue that contemporary problems around religiouslymotivated terrorism havemade
the typology mentioned more topical than several decades ago. The agnostic state and its
concomitant secularism (model v) is under threat by the protagonists of theocracy. Unfortunately,
theocracy gets violent support nowadays from the side of religious terrorism. This means that it is
all the more important and at the same time difficult to uphold the principles of a secular state.
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